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REDISCOVERING SCHOOL SCIENCE
Arvind Kumar
Understanding	nature	of	science	is,	now,	widely	perceived	to	be	a	vital	
learning	outcome	of	science	education.	In	this	article,	we	briefly	discuss	the	
rationale	for	introducing	‘nature	of	science’	in	school	science	curricula,	its	
evolving	perspectives,	and	the	approaches	we	may	adopt	to	enable	the	learning	of	
this	topic.	
Introduction
hat	is	science?	It	is	not	uncommon	for	
W textbooks	of	science	to	begin	with	this	question	in	the	introductory	chapter,	
devote	a	few	paragraphs	to	it,	and	then	get	on	
quickly	with	what	is	regarded	as	the	main	stuff	of	
science:	its	empirical	facts,	laws,	theories,	etc.	
Typically,	the	books	would	say:	science	involves	
making	systematic	unbiased	observations	of	
nature,	doing	careful	experiments,	and	drawing	
logical	inferences	from	them.	In	this	way,	we	
arrive	at	the	laws	of	nature.	We	suggest	
hypotheses	to	understand	the	empirical	laws,	
which	then	lead	us	to	build	elaborate	theories	to	
explain	the	known	physical	phenomena.	Theories	
also	predict	new	phenomena.	If	the	predictions	
are	verified,	the	theory	is	confirmed.	Science	
bows	to	no	authority;	it	is	objective	knowledge	
obtained	from	observations	and	experiments.	
There	is	much	that	makes	sense	in	this	
description	of	nature	of	science,	simplistic	though	
it	will	seem	as	we	discuss	it	further.	But	first,	we	
must	ask	why	it	is	necessary	at	all	to	teach	nature	
of	science	when	there	is	so	little	time	to	finish	the	
‘more	important’	parts	of	the	subject.	
Why	teach	‘Nature	of	Science’	(NOS)	
To	respond	to	this	question,	we	must	pause	to	
reflect	on	what	is	the	purpose	of	teaching	science	
in	school.	Science	is	a	compulsory	subject	in	the	
Indian	school	curriculum	till	the	end	of	secondary	
school.	A	majority	of	students	will	cease	to	go	for	
further	formal	education;	of	those	who	do	pursue	
higher	stages	of	education,	many	would	go	to	
commerce,	arts	and	other	streams.	Therefore,	
only	a	small	fraction	of	students	finishing	Class	X	
will	choose	to	continue	in	the	science	stream,	and	
a	still	smaller	fraction	of	this	number	will	go	on	to	
become	scientists	or	other	professionals	who	
directly	need	science	and	its	applications	in	their	
careers.	Thus	most	people	are	unlikely	to	need	
any	scientific	content	knowledge	(of	the	kind	
learnt	at	school)	in	their	professions.	
Why,	then,	have	we	made	science	education	
compulsory	at	the	school	level?	Clearly,	this	would	
make	sense	only	if	the	main	purpose	of	school	
science	education	was	somewhat	broad	and	not	
limited	to	specific	science	content	only.	The	goals	
of	school	science	education	have	been	debated	
endlessly,	often	with	differing	ideological	stances;	
but	few	would	disagree	that	a	principal	goal	is	to	
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inductive	generalization	from	unbiased	
observations	of	nature,	and	controlled	
experiments.	Bacon	foresaw	the	immense	power	
of	this	new	method	in	not	only	predicting,	but	also	
controlling	phenomena.	
In	the	beginning	of	the	20th	century,	an	influential	
group	of	philosophers	of	science	undertook	to	
formulate	a	more	rigorous	version	of	the	scientific	
method.	Briefly,	they	regarded	a	statement	or	an	
assertion	meaningful	only	if	it	was	either	logically	
self-evident,	or	could	be	put	in	a	verifiable	form;	
science	must	only	have	such	meaningful	
statements.	For	convenience,	we	may	use	
theoretical	terms	like	‘atom’,	‘gene’,	‘valency’,	but	
ultimately,	all	scientific	assertions	must	be	
reducible	to	observation	statements.	By	this	strict	
criterion,	poetry	is	meaningless,	if	harmless,	
while	a	metaphysical	assertion	is	both	
meaningless	and	harmful,	since	it	purports	to	be	
true!	The	proponents	of	this	philosophy,	called	
logical	positivism	(and	in	its	later,	more	moderate,	
version,	called	logical	empiricism),	could	not	
realise	their	ambition	of	translating	all	of	science	
in	these	terms.	
In	the	same	spirit	of	analysing	the	scientific	
method,	but	distinct	from	logical	positivism	in	
many	ways,	was	the	philosophy	of	Karl	Popper.	
Popper	was	driven	by	a	desire	to	differentiate	
between	science	and,	what	he	regarded	as,	
pseudoscience.	He	is	famous	for	his	falsification	
criterion:	a	theory	is	not	scientific	if	there	is	no	
way	to	refute	it.	Good	scientific	theories	give	
unambiguous	predictions	that	are	falsifiable.	If	
the	prediction	is	verified,	you	have	not	confirmed	
the	theory;	you	have	simply	not	shown	it	to	be	
false	yet.	This	is	precisely	where	pseudo-sciences	
differ—they	do	not	give	clear-cut	testable	
predictions,	and	can	accommodate	any	
observation.	Popper	advocated	that	science	
should	‘stick	its	neck	out’,	give	bold	new	
predictions,	and	suggest	critical	experiments	that	
have	the	potential	to	falsify	a	theory.	Popper	was	
inspired	by	Einstein’s	work,	and	his	ideas	usually	
resonate	with	scientists;	he	is	often	called	the	
scientists’	philosopher.	
In	an	incisive	criticism	of	these	dominant	ideas,	
around	the	1950s,	Quine	argued	that	a	scientific	
theory	is	a	complex	web	of	interconnected	
assumptions	and	claims	that	relate	to	experience	
as	a	whole.	Consequently,	it	is	not	possible	to	test	
or	falsify	each	statement	of	the	theory	in	isolation.	
He	called	for	a	holistic	theory	of	meaning	
and	testing.
By	epistemic	beliefs	we	mean	our	ideas	
on	how	scientific	knowledge	is	
generated	and	justified;	by	ontological	
beliefs	we	mean	broadly	our	ideas	on	
the	basic	categories	of	objects	that	
exist	in	nature.	For	example,	classical	
physics	regards	particles	and	
electromagnetic	waves	as	two	distinct	
ontological	categories,	a	distinction	
that	gets	blurred	in	modern	physics.
generate	an	informed	science	citizenry	in	the	
country.	Students	need	to	grow	into	citizens	who	
have	a	feel	for	what	science	is	about,	what	
methods	and	processes	are	involved	in	generating	
new	science,	and	what	relation	science	has	with	
technology	and	society.	This	has	become	
increasingly	necessary,	because	science	and	
technology	are	deeply	impacting	our	ways	of	
living.	Citizens	need	to	have	some	minimal	
familiarity	with	modern	technology,	its	possible	
benefits	and	risks;	its	impact	on	our	health	and	
environment,	etc.;	so	that	they	can	make	informed	
choices,	and	formulate	mature	opinions	about	
these	issues.	Science,	some	would	argue,	has	
ushered	in	the	Age	of	Reason,	and	can	help	
encourage	a	rational	outlook	about	life	(though	at	
present	this	seems	like	a	distant	goal!).	These,	and	
several	other	allied	objectives,	are	sometimes,	
clubbed	under	the	head	‘science	and	technology	
literacy’.	There	are	numerous	variants	of	this	
term,	and	many	shades	and	nuances,	but,	
perhaps,	it	is	safe	to	say	that	the	rationale	for	
teaching	NOS	is	tied	closely	to	this	general	goal	of	
school	science	education.
Does	that	mean	we	incorporate	the	teaching	of	
NOS	at	the	expense	of	the	‘real’	content	of	
science?	In	doing	so,	do	we	not	jeopardise	the	
quality	of	knowledge	of	our	future	scientists?	Will	
our	country	not	lose	out	on	its	competitive	
edge	in	science?	And,	in	any	case,	will	
the	teaching	of	NOS	be	of	any	real	
use	for	the	larger	majority	of	
students	we	have	in	mind?
These	concerns,	widely	
shared	among	teachers	
(and	scientists),	arise	
naturally	because	the	
relevance	of	NOS	in	the	
school	science	curriculum,	
and	its	pedagogy,	are	still	
not	very	clear.	First,	it	is	not	
correct	to	think	that	NOS	is	
relevant	only	for	the	non-
science	group	indicated	above,	
and	that	future	scientists	need	to	
focus	only	on	acquiring	conceptual	
knowledge	that	is	at	the	core	of	their	
subject.	On	the	contrary,	there	is	an	increasing	
feeling	among	educators	that	learning	NOS	can	
deepen	one’s	understanding	of	the	subject	itself.	
For	the	past	few	decades,	science	education	
researchers	have	carried	out	detailed	studies	at	
different	levels,	on	the	epistemic	and	ontological	
beliefs	of	students	with	regard	to	their	subject,	
and	have	concluded	that	these	could	have	a	
bearing	on	their	critical	understanding	of	the	
content	of	the	subject.	
In	short,	understanding	nature	of	science	is	not	
only	relevant	for	the	general	goal	of	promoting	
science	and	technology	literacy;	it	is	just	as	
relevant	to	a	science	student,	in	developing	a	
deeper	appreciation	for	her	subject.	
Second,	what	is	envisaged	is	not	to	‘dilute’	the	
content	of	science,	but	rather	to	use	it	
imaginatively,	as	a	means	to	teach	NOS,	among	
other	things.	In	other	words,	NOS	is	to	be	taught,	
not	by	preaching	abstract	generalities	set	aside	in	
a	separate	unit	of	the	book;	it	is	to	be	put	
in	context	by	interleaving	it	with	the	
content	of	science.	Before	we	see	
how	that	might	be	done,	we	
must	first	broadly	agree	on	
what	our	views	are	on	
‘nature	of	science’.	
Nature	of	science:	
evolving	
perspectives	
The	nature	of	science	has	
been	a	subject	of	
philosophical	inquiry	all	
through	history,	and	continues	
to	be	so,	even	now.	As	science	has	
advanced,	particularly	in	the	last	four	
centuries,	so	have	our	ideas	about	the	
nature	of	science.	When,	in	the	16th	and	17th	
centuries,	modern	science	was	being	shaped	by	
the	work	of	Galileo,	Descartes,	Kepler	and	
Newton;	Francis	Bacon	was	formulating,	what	we	
now	call,	the	scientific	method.	Roughly	speaking,	
the	introductory	paragraph	of	this	article	
replicates	Bacon’s	ideas	of	nature	of	science.	The	
essence	of	Bacon’s	ideas	is	that	science	is	
Philosophies	seeking	a	rational	basis	of	science,	
clearly	separated	the	context	of	discovery	(the	
intuitive	creative	phase	of	science	embedded	in	
particular	social	settings)	from	the	context	of	
justification	(critical	philosophical	scrutiny	of	
theories	claimed	to	be	correct).	The	former	was	
thought	to	belong	to	the	realm	of	psychology	
/sociology.	This	distinction	kept	the	actual	
practice	of	science,	largely,	beyond	their	purview.	
In	other	words,	the	attempt	was	to	formulate	
what	the	scientific	method	should	be,	rather	than	
what	it	was	actually.
Around	1960s,	Thomas	Kuhn’s,	now	famous,	book	
‘The	Structure	of	Scientific	Revolutions’,	marked	
the	beginning	of	a	major	transformation	of	our	
ideas	of	nature	of	science,	and	how	it	progresses.	
Analyzing	some	key	milestones	in	the	history	of	
science	(such	as	the	Copernican	revolution),	Kuhn	
concluded	that	scientists	normally	work	within	a	
certain	paradigm;	they	are	conservative	up	to	a	
point,	and	do	not	abandon	their	existing	theories	
even	in	the	face	of	some	anomalies	(disagreement	
with	experiment).	However,	when	the	anomalies	
are	stark	and	accumulate	with	time,	there	is	a	
crisis	in	normal	science,	and	the	existing	
paradigm	is	questioned.	All	kinds	of	alternative	
ideas	float	during	the	crisis,	out	of	which	some	
promising	new	ideas	begin	to	attract	consensus,	
often	because	of	some	particularly	striking	
exemplars.	A	new	paradigm	is	born,	and	normal	
science	returns,	in	which	scientists	work	out	the	
details	and	applications	of	the	changed	paradigm.			
	The	key	point	to	note	in	Kuhn’s	philosophy	is	that	
the	paradigm	shift	is	not	governed	by	a	purely	
rational	process;	it	involves	a	social	consensus	in	
the	scientific	community.	The	adherence	to	an	
existing	paradigm	in	normal	science	is	secured	
through	training	in	our	colleges	and	graduate	
schools.	Not	everybody	agreed	with	Kuhn.	
Lakotos	found	the	undermining	of	the	rational	
basis	of	scientific	progress	implied	in	Kuhn’s	ideas	
unacceptable,	and	developed	his	own	theory	in	
terms	of	the	notion	of	competing	‘research	
programmes’.	Feyerabend	dismissed	the	very	idea	
that	there	is	any	clear	method	in	the	way	science	
evolves.	His	philosophy	is	often	summarized	by	
the	catchy	line:	‘anything	goes’.	His	noted	book	
‘Against	Method’	celebrates	creativity	in	science	
and	advocates	freedom	of	imagination.	Thus	
while	Lakotos	found	the	disorder	inherent	in	
Kuhn’s	view	of	science	alarming,	Feyerebend	
criticized	Kuhn	for	just	the	opposite	reason--	for	
his	orderly	and	mechanical	view	of	scientific	
Francis	Bacon's	work	established	
the	Scientific	Method
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inductive	generalization	from	unbiased	
observations	of	nature,	and	controlled	
experiments.	Bacon	foresaw	the	immense	power	
of	this	new	method	in	not	only	predicting,	but	also	
controlling	phenomena.	
In	the	beginning	of	the	20th	century,	an	influential	
group	of	philosophers	of	science	undertook	to	
formulate	a	more	rigorous	version	of	the	scientific	
method.	Briefly,	they	regarded	a	statement	or	an	
assertion	meaningful	only	if	it	was	either	logically	
self-evident,	or	could	be	put	in	a	verifiable	form;	
science	must	only	have	such	meaningful	
statements.	For	convenience,	we	may	use	
theoretical	terms	like	‘atom’,	‘gene’,	‘valency’,	but	
ultimately,	all	scientific	assertions	must	be	
reducible	to	observation	statements.	By	this	strict	
criterion,	poetry	is	meaningless,	if	harmless,	
while	a	metaphysical	assertion	is	both	
meaningless	and	harmful,	since	it	purports	to	be	
true!	The	proponents	of	this	philosophy,	called	
logical	positivism	(and	in	its	later,	more	moderate,	
version,	called	logical	empiricism),	could	not	
realise	their	ambition	of	translating	all	of	science	
in	these	terms.	
In	the	same	spirit	of	analysing	the	scientific	
method,	but	distinct	from	logical	positivism	in	
many	ways,	was	the	philosophy	of	Karl	Popper.	
Popper	was	driven	by	a	desire	to	differentiate	
between	science	and,	what	he	regarded	as,	
pseudoscience.	He	is	famous	for	his	falsification	
criterion:	a	theory	is	not	scientific	if	there	is	no	
way	to	refute	it.	Good	scientific	theories	give	
unambiguous	predictions	that	are	falsifiable.	If	
the	prediction	is	verified,	you	have	not	confirmed	
the	theory;	you	have	simply	not	shown	it	to	be	
false	yet.	This	is	precisely	where	pseudo-sciences	
differ—they	do	not	give	clear-cut	testable	
predictions,	and	can	accommodate	any	
observation.	Popper	advocated	that	science	
should	‘stick	its	neck	out’,	give	bold	new	
predictions,	and	suggest	critical	experiments	that	
have	the	potential	to	falsify	a	theory.	Popper	was	
inspired	by	Einstein’s	work,	and	his	ideas	usually	
resonate	with	scientists;	he	is	often	called	the	
scientists’	philosopher.	
In	an	incisive	criticism	of	these	dominant	ideas,	
around	the	1950s,	Quine	argued	that	a	scientific	
theory	is	a	complex	web	of	interconnected	
assumptions	and	claims	that	relate	to	experience	
as	a	whole.	Consequently,	it	is	not	possible	to	test	
or	falsify	each	statement	of	the	theory	in	isolation.	
He	called	for	a	holistic	theory	of	meaning	
and	testing.
By	epistemic	beliefs	we	mean	our	ideas	
on	how	scientific	knowledge	is	
generated	and	justified;	by	ontological	
beliefs	we	mean	broadly	our	ideas	on	
the	basic	categories	of	objects	that	
exist	in	nature.	For	example,	classical	
physics	regards	particles	and	
electromagnetic	waves	as	two	distinct	
ontological	categories,	a	distinction	
that	gets	blurred	in	modern	physics.
generate	an	informed	science	citizenry	in	the	
country.	Students	need	to	grow	into	citizens	who	
have	a	feel	for	what	science	is	about,	what	
methods	and	processes	are	involved	in	generating	
new	science,	and	what	relation	science	has	with	
technology	and	society.	This	has	become	
increasingly	necessary,	because	science	and	
technology	are	deeply	impacting	our	ways	of	
living.	Citizens	need	to	have	some	minimal	
familiarity	with	modern	technology,	its	possible	
benefits	and	risks;	its	impact	on	our	health	and	
environment,	etc.;	so	that	they	can	make	informed	
choices,	and	formulate	mature	opinions	about	
these	issues.	Science,	some	would	argue,	has	
ushered	in	the	Age	of	Reason,	and	can	help	
encourage	a	rational	outlook	about	life	(though	at	
present	this	seems	like	a	distant	goal!).	These,	and	
several	other	allied	objectives,	are	sometimes,	
clubbed	under	the	head	‘science	and	technology	
literacy’.	There	are	numerous	variants	of	this	
term,	and	many	shades	and	nuances,	but,	
perhaps,	it	is	safe	to	say	that	the	rationale	for	
teaching	NOS	is	tied	closely	to	this	general	goal	of	
school	science	education.
Does	that	mean	we	incorporate	the	teaching	of	
NOS	at	the	expense	of	the	‘real’	content	of	
science?	In	doing	so,	do	we	not	jeopardise	the	
quality	of	knowledge	of	our	future	scientists?	Will	
our	country	not	lose	out	on	its	competitive	
edge	in	science?	And,	in	any	case,	will	
the	teaching	of	NOS	be	of	any	real	
use	for	the	larger	majority	of	
students	we	have	in	mind?
These	concerns,	widely	
shared	among	teachers	
(and	scientists),	arise	
naturally	because	the	
relevance	of	NOS	in	the	
school	science	curriculum,	
and	its	pedagogy,	are	still	
not	very	clear.	First,	it	is	not	
correct	to	think	that	NOS	is	
relevant	only	for	the	non-
science	group	indicated	above,	
and	that	future	scientists	need	to	
focus	only	on	acquiring	conceptual	
knowledge	that	is	at	the	core	of	their	
subject.	On	the	contrary,	there	is	an	increasing	
feeling	among	educators	that	learning	NOS	can	
deepen	one’s	understanding	of	the	subject	itself.	
For	the	past	few	decades,	science	education	
researchers	have	carried	out	detailed	studies	at	
different	levels,	on	the	epistemic	and	ontological	
beliefs	of	students	with	regard	to	their	subject,	
and	have	concluded	that	these	could	have	a	
bearing	on	their	critical	understanding	of	the	
content	of	the	subject.	
In	short,	understanding	nature	of	science	is	not	
only	relevant	for	the	general	goal	of	promoting	
science	and	technology	literacy;	it	is	just	as	
relevant	to	a	science	student,	in	developing	a	
deeper	appreciation	for	her	subject.	
Second,	what	is	envisaged	is	not	to	‘dilute’	the	
content	of	science,	but	rather	to	use	it	
imaginatively,	as	a	means	to	teach	NOS,	among	
other	things.	In	other	words,	NOS	is	to	be	taught,	
not	by	preaching	abstract	generalities	set	aside	in	
a	separate	unit	of	the	book;	it	is	to	be	put	
in	context	by	interleaving	it	with	the	
content	of	science.	Before	we	see	
how	that	might	be	done,	we	
must	first	broadly	agree	on	
what	our	views	are	on	
‘nature	of	science’.	
Nature	of	science:	
evolving	
perspectives	
The	nature	of	science	has	
been	a	subject	of	
philosophical	inquiry	all	
through	history,	and	continues	
to	be	so,	even	now.	As	science	has	
advanced,	particularly	in	the	last	four	
centuries,	so	have	our	ideas	about	the	
nature	of	science.	When,	in	the	16th	and	17th	
centuries,	modern	science	was	being	shaped	by	
the	work	of	Galileo,	Descartes,	Kepler	and	
Newton;	Francis	Bacon	was	formulating,	what	we	
now	call,	the	scientific	method.	Roughly	speaking,	
the	introductory	paragraph	of	this	article	
replicates	Bacon’s	ideas	of	nature	of	science.	The	
essence	of	Bacon’s	ideas	is	that	science	is	
Philosophies	seeking	a	rational	basis	of	science,	
clearly	separated	the	context	of	discovery	(the	
intuitive	creative	phase	of	science	embedded	in	
particular	social	settings)	from	the	context	of	
justification	(critical	philosophical	scrutiny	of	
theories	claimed	to	be	correct).	The	former	was	
thought	to	belong	to	the	realm	of	psychology	
/sociology.	This	distinction	kept	the	actual	
practice	of	science,	largely,	beyond	their	purview.	
In	other	words,	the	attempt	was	to	formulate	
what	the	scientific	method	should	be,	rather	than	
what	it	was	actually.
Around	1960s,	Thomas	Kuhn’s,	now	famous,	book	
‘The	Structure	of	Scientific	Revolutions’,	marked	
the	beginning	of	a	major	transformation	of	our	
ideas	of	nature	of	science,	and	how	it	progresses.	
Analyzing	some	key	milestones	in	the	history	of	
science	(such	as	the	Copernican	revolution),	Kuhn	
concluded	that	scientists	normally	work	within	a	
certain	paradigm;	they	are	conservative	up	to	a	
point,	and	do	not	abandon	their	existing	theories	
even	in	the	face	of	some	anomalies	(disagreement	
with	experiment).	However,	when	the	anomalies	
are	stark	and	accumulate	with	time,	there	is	a	
crisis	in	normal	science,	and	the	existing	
paradigm	is	questioned.	All	kinds	of	alternative	
ideas	float	during	the	crisis,	out	of	which	some	
promising	new	ideas	begin	to	attract	consensus,	
often	because	of	some	particularly	striking	
exemplars.	A	new	paradigm	is	born,	and	normal	
science	returns,	in	which	scientists	work	out	the	
details	and	applications	of	the	changed	paradigm.			
	The	key	point	to	note	in	Kuhn’s	philosophy	is	that	
the	paradigm	shift	is	not	governed	by	a	purely	
rational	process;	it	involves	a	social	consensus	in	
the	scientific	community.	The	adherence	to	an	
existing	paradigm	in	normal	science	is	secured	
through	training	in	our	colleges	and	graduate	
schools.	Not	everybody	agreed	with	Kuhn.	
Lakotos	found	the	undermining	of	the	rational	
basis	of	scientific	progress	implied	in	Kuhn’s	ideas	
unacceptable,	and	developed	his	own	theory	in	
terms	of	the	notion	of	competing	‘research	
programmes’.	Feyerabend	dismissed	the	very	idea	
that	there	is	any	clear	method	in	the	way	science	
evolves.	His	philosophy	is	often	summarized	by	
the	catchy	line:	‘anything	goes’.	His	noted	book	
‘Against	Method’	celebrates	creativity	in	science	
and	advocates	freedom	of	imagination.	Thus	
while	Lakotos	found	the	disorder	inherent	in	
Kuhn’s	view	of	science	alarming,	Feyerebend	
criticized	Kuhn	for	just	the	opposite	reason--	for	
his	orderly	and	mechanical	view	of	scientific	
Francis	Bacon's	work	established	
the	Scientific	Method
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progress.	Normal	science	had	a	very	significant	
role	in	Kuhn’s	scheme,	since	it	goes	deep	into	an	
accepted	paradigm,	making	it	possible	to	discover	
anomalies	that	eventually	result	in	changing	the	
paradigm.	Feyerebend,	on	the	other	hand,	
criticizes	the	routine	mind-numbing	activities	of	
normal	science,	and	asserts	that	science	
progresses	through	creative	leaps	of	imagination	
that	defy	existing	ideas.	
Whatever	the	merits	of	Kuhn’s	theory,	it	was	
certainly	responsible	for	introducing	a	
sociological	dimension	to	philosophy	of	science,	
in	the	second	half	of	the	20th	century.	Indeed	
some	sociologists	viewed	the	standard	
philosophy	of	science	as	irrelevant,	and	asserted	
that	we	can	understand	nature	of	science	only	by	
a	critical	and	detailed	probing	of	the	actual	way	in	
which	scientists	work.	This	development	has	
taken	the	debate	on	nature	of	science	in	many	
different	directions	that	we	cannot	adequately	
describe	here.	But,	we	certainly	have	a	better	
perspective	now	on	the	socio-cultural	norms	that	
enable	science	to	grow.	For	example,	it	seems	
clear	that	the	formation	of	robust	social	
institutions	of	science	(Scientific	Societies	in	
Europe,	such	as	the	Royal	Society)	practising	
norms	of	open	and	democratic	discussion,	peer	
reviewing	of	research,	and	communal	ownership	
of	scientific	laws,	etc.	was	as	crucial	for	the	
growth	of	science,	as	the	ingenuity	of	
individual	scientists.
We	can	summarise	some	new	insights	on	nature	
of	science	that	have	gradually	emerged	from	these	
discourses.	First,	science	is	not	just	induction	
from	observations	and	experimental	data;	it	often	
involves	imaginative	and	radical	new	ideas	not	
necessarily	suggested	by	them.	For	example,	some	
of	the	most	successful	theories	of	science	have	
arisen	from	general	considerations	of	simplicity	
and	symmetry,	and	a	drive	for	unification.	Second,	
though	observations	of	nature	are	often	the	
starting	point,	not	all	observations	are	neutral	-	
they	are	‘theory-laden’;	theories,	implicitly	or	
explicitly,	guide	us	to	where	and	what	to	
experiment	and	observe	(this	does	not	
necessarily	undermine	the	objectivity	of	science).	
Third,	observations	and	experimental	data	
underdetermine	correct	theory;	several	different	
theories	can	all	be	consistent	with	them.	Fourth,	
science	is	not	a	purely	cognitive	endeavour;	
though	it	is	certainly	constrained	by	the	empirical	
facts	of	nature,	it	also	involves	some	social	
consensus	among	scientists	and	needs	enabling	
socio-cultural	norms	and	conditions	for	its	
growth.	Fifth,	science,	technology	and	society	
(STS)	are	intertwined	in	complex	ways,	affecting	
and	being	affected	by	one	another.	A	corollary	of	
the	last	point	is	that	we	must	be	alert	to	the	
possible	pitfalls	in	scientific	practice	and	the	
harmful	consequences	of	uncritical	and	unwise	
use	of	technology.
This	brief	overview	is	intended	only	to	give	a	
flavour	of	the	subject;	it	admittedly	does	not	
capture	the	many	subtle	aspects	of	philosophy	of	
science.	See,	for	example,	Godfrey-Smith	(2003)¹	
for	a	deeper	treatment	of	this	subject,	and	for	
references	of	the	classic	works	mentioned	above.
Nature	of	science:	how	and	what	
to	teach
With	so	much	of	the	historical	debate	on	nature	of	
science	continuing	into	the	present,	what	is	it	that	
we	wish	students	to	learn	about	NOS	in	school	
education?	Obviously,	we	cannot	import	the	
complex	philosophical	issues	on	the	matter	into	
our	classrooms.	There	has	been	much	reflection	
on	this	point,	and	the	feeling	is	that	despite	the	
wide	range	of	perspectives,	there	is	a	core	of	
generally	accepted	new	ideas	in	NOS	that	are	
learnable	by	young	students.	We	recommend	
referring	to	the	New	Generation	Science	
Standards	NGSS	(2013)²	developed	in	the	U.S.A.	
Of	course,	similar	objectives	have	been	advocated	
elsewhere;	see,	for	example,	Pumfrey	(1991)³,	
Osborne	et	al	(2002)⁴;	and	also	Taylor	and	Hunt	
(2014)⁵.	For	a	much	deeper	perspective	on	the	
subject,	see	Erduran	and	Dagher	(2014)⁶.	We	
summarize,	here,	what	in	our	view	appears	to	be	
a	broad	consensus;	more	details	on	NOS	
objectives	can	be	found	in	the	references	cited.	
Nature	of	Science	Objectives	(Summary)		
Students	should	appreciate	that…
Scope		
…Science	seeks	to	describe	and	explain	the	physical	
world	based	on	empirical	evidence.	Some	domains	
may	be	beyond	its	scope.	
Methods		
…Science	adopts	a	variety	of	approaches	and	
methods;	there	is	no	one	universal	method	of	
science.
Science	does	not	involve	induction	only.	Creativity	
and	imagination	are	equally	important	in	
generating	hypotheses	and	building	theories.	
Observations	and	experiments	are	often	
insufficient	to	determine	a	theory.		
Science	involves	expert	judgements,	
and	not	just	logical	deductions.	
Hence	there	can	be	
disagreement.
Social	aspects
…Science	is	a	co-operative	
multi-cultural	human	
enterprise	to	which	
countless	men	and	
women	contribute,	
including	some	noted	
individuals	who	play	a	
significant	role.	Social	
institutions	practising	
norms	of	open	debate,	peer	
reviewing	and	common	
ownership	of	knowledge	are	vital	
for	its	growth.
Science	and	technology	may	lead	to	issues	that	
need	socio-cultural	resolution.			
Scientific	knowledge	
…is	dynamic	and	subject	to	revision	by	new	
empirical	evidence.	
Finally,	the	most	important	but	difficult	question:	
what	pedagogy	is	to	be	employed	to	teach	NOS?	
The	idea	that	content	alone	is	not	enough	in	
science	education	is	not	new,	as	the	history	of	
curriculum	reforms	since	the	1960s	(or	even	
earlier)	shows.	Around	the	1970s,	some	
educational	reforms	emphasized	processes	of	
science	more	than	its	content:	observing,	
measuring,	classifying,	analysing,	inferring,	
interpreting,	experimenting,	predicting,	
communicating,	etc.	Soon	there	were	critical	
appraisals	of	this	approach;	some	educators	
questioned	the	very	premise	that	there	are	a	set	
of	general	transferable	processes	common	to	all	
sciences.	See,	for	example,	Millar	and	Driver	
(1987)⁷.	For	some	time	now,	there	seems	to	be	a	
broad	convergence	on	an	Inquiry-based	approach	
to	science	learning	and	teaching.	This	approach,	
informed	by	the	constructivist	philosophy,	no	
doubt,	involves	learning	the	processes	of	science	
mentioned	above;	but	it	goes	much	further,	to	
include	posing	questions,	critical	thinking,	giving	
evidence-based	explanation,	justifying	it,	and	
connecting	it	to	existing	scientific	knowledge,	etc.	
Basically,	this	approach	advocates	the	learning	of	
science	in	a	manner	that	resembles	the	way	
scientists	carry	out	their	investigations.
Inquiry	tasks	are	naturally	relatively	simple	for	
younger	children,	and	quite	elaborate	for	the	
more	mature	students,	but	they	
share	the	common	feature	of	
posing	a	question	and	seeking	
an	evidence-based	
explanation.	They	can	have	
different	foci;	some	may	
relate	to	STS	issues,	
while	others	may	be	
more	discipline-
oriented.	Inquiry	may	
also	include	reflections	
on	the	inquiry	mode	
itself,	and	thus	naturally	
incorporate	NOS	
educational	objectives.	We	
refer	the	reader	to	a	critical	
account	of	the	Inquiry	
approach,	including	its	relation	
with	NOS,	in	Flick	and	Lederman	
(2006)⁸.
	Another	approach	uses	the	History	of	Science	
(HOS)	as	a	means	to	teach	NOS.	This	again	is	not	a	
new	idea;	see	the	excellent	book	by	Holton	and	
Brush	(2001)⁹.	Some	key	points	in	its	favour	are	
thought	to	be:	HOS	involves	human	narratives	
which	enliven	science	and	engage	students’	
interest;	it	often	has	parallels	with	students’	
spontaneous	conceptions	and	thus	helps	us	in	
anticipating	and	remedying	their	content-specific	
ideas;	knowing	how	present	science	arose	from	
competing	ideas	at	different	times	in	history	can	
promote	critical	thinking;	and	lastly,	HOS	is	the	
most	natural	setting	for	learning	NOS.	We	refer	
the	reader	to	a	comprehensive	Handbook	brought	
out	recently	on	this	issue	(Matthews	2014)¹⁰.	
As	Lederman	(2006)¹¹	has	forcefully	argued,	NOS	
objectives	should	be	regarded	as	primarily	
cognitive	outcomes	that	can	be	properly	assessed.	
Instruction	needs	to	bring	them	out	explicitly,	
they	are	unlikely	to	be	assimilated	implicitly,	
whether	we	adopt	an	Inquiry	or	a	History	based	
approach.	A	whole	range	of	inquiry	tasks	and	HOS	
based	vignettes,	explicitly	focussed	on	NOS;	need	
to	be	developed	if	we	aim	to	improve	student	
understanding	of	nature	of	science.
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progress.	Normal	science	had	a	very	significant	
role	in	Kuhn’s	scheme,	since	it	goes	deep	into	an	
accepted	paradigm,	making	it	possible	to	discover	
anomalies	that	eventually	result	in	changing	the	
paradigm.	Feyerebend,	on	the	other	hand,	
criticizes	the	routine	mind-numbing	activities	of	
normal	science,	and	asserts	that	science	
progresses	through	creative	leaps	of	imagination	
that	defy	existing	ideas.	
Whatever	the	merits	of	Kuhn’s	theory,	it	was	
certainly	responsible	for	introducing	a	
sociological	dimension	to	philosophy	of	science,	
in	the	second	half	of	the	20th	century.	Indeed	
some	sociologists	viewed	the	standard	
philosophy	of	science	as	irrelevant,	and	asserted	
that	we	can	understand	nature	of	science	only	by	
a	critical	and	detailed	probing	of	the	actual	way	in	
which	scientists	work.	This	development	has	
taken	the	debate	on	nature	of	science	in	many	
different	directions	that	we	cannot	adequately	
describe	here.	But,	we	certainly	have	a	better	
perspective	now	on	the	socio-cultural	norms	that	
enable	science	to	grow.	For	example,	it	seems	
clear	that	the	formation	of	robust	social	
institutions	of	science	(Scientific	Societies	in	
Europe,	such	as	the	Royal	Society)	practising	
norms	of	open	and	democratic	discussion,	peer	
reviewing	of	research,	and	communal	ownership	
of	scientific	laws,	etc.	was	as	crucial	for	the	
growth	of	science,	as	the	ingenuity	of	
individual	scientists.
We	can	summarise	some	new	insights	on	nature	
of	science	that	have	gradually	emerged	from	these	
discourses.	First,	science	is	not	just	induction	
from	observations	and	experimental	data;	it	often	
involves	imaginative	and	radical	new	ideas	not	
necessarily	suggested	by	them.	For	example,	some	
of	the	most	successful	theories	of	science	have	
arisen	from	general	considerations	of	simplicity	
and	symmetry,	and	a	drive	for	unification.	Second,	
though	observations	of	nature	are	often	the	
starting	point,	not	all	observations	are	neutral	-	
they	are	‘theory-laden’;	theories,	implicitly	or	
explicitly,	guide	us	to	where	and	what	to	
experiment	and	observe	(this	does	not	
necessarily	undermine	the	objectivity	of	science).	
Third,	observations	and	experimental	data	
underdetermine	correct	theory;	several	different	
theories	can	all	be	consistent	with	them.	Fourth,	
science	is	not	a	purely	cognitive	endeavour;	
though	it	is	certainly	constrained	by	the	empirical	
facts	of	nature,	it	also	involves	some	social	
consensus	among	scientists	and	needs	enabling	
socio-cultural	norms	and	conditions	for	its	
growth.	Fifth,	science,	technology	and	society	
(STS)	are	intertwined	in	complex	ways,	affecting	
and	being	affected	by	one	another.	A	corollary	of	
the	last	point	is	that	we	must	be	alert	to	the	
possible	pitfalls	in	scientific	practice	and	the	
harmful	consequences	of	uncritical	and	unwise	
use	of	technology.
This	brief	overview	is	intended	only	to	give	a	
flavour	of	the	subject;	it	admittedly	does	not	
capture	the	many	subtle	aspects	of	philosophy	of	
science.	See,	for	example,	Godfrey-Smith	(2003)¹	
for	a	deeper	treatment	of	this	subject,	and	for	
references	of	the	classic	works	mentioned	above.
Nature	of	science:	how	and	what	
to	teach
With	so	much	of	the	historical	debate	on	nature	of	
science	continuing	into	the	present,	what	is	it	that	
we	wish	students	to	learn	about	NOS	in	school	
education?	Obviously,	we	cannot	import	the	
complex	philosophical	issues	on	the	matter	into	
our	classrooms.	There	has	been	much	reflection	
on	this	point,	and	the	feeling	is	that	despite	the	
wide	range	of	perspectives,	there	is	a	core	of	
generally	accepted	new	ideas	in	NOS	that	are	
learnable	by	young	students.	We	recommend	
referring	to	the	New	Generation	Science	
Standards	NGSS	(2013)²	developed	in	the	U.S.A.	
Of	course,	similar	objectives	have	been	advocated	
elsewhere;	see,	for	example,	Pumfrey	(1991)³,	
Osborne	et	al	(2002)⁴;	and	also	Taylor	and	Hunt	
(2014)⁵.	For	a	much	deeper	perspective	on	the	
subject,	see	Erduran	and	Dagher	(2014)⁶.	We	
summarize,	here,	what	in	our	view	appears	to	be	
a	broad	consensus;	more	details	on	NOS	
objectives	can	be	found	in	the	references	cited.	
Nature	of	Science	Objectives	(Summary)		
Students	should	appreciate	that…
Scope		
…Science	seeks	to	describe	and	explain	the	physical	
world	based	on	empirical	evidence.	Some	domains	
may	be	beyond	its	scope.	
Methods		
…Science	adopts	a	variety	of	approaches	and	
methods;	there	is	no	one	universal	method	of	
science.
Science	does	not	involve	induction	only.	Creativity	
and	imagination	are	equally	important	in	
generating	hypotheses	and	building	theories.	
Observations	and	experiments	are	often	
insufficient	to	determine	a	theory.		
Science	involves	expert	judgements,	
and	not	just	logical	deductions.	
Hence	there	can	be	
disagreement.
Social	aspects
…Science	is	a	co-operative	
multi-cultural	human	
enterprise	to	which	
countless	men	and	
women	contribute,	
including	some	noted	
individuals	who	play	a	
significant	role.	Social	
institutions	practising	
norms	of	open	debate,	peer	
reviewing	and	common	
ownership	of	knowledge	are	vital	
for	its	growth.
Science	and	technology	may	lead	to	issues	that	
need	socio-cultural	resolution.			
Scientific	knowledge	
…is	dynamic	and	subject	to	revision	by	new	
empirical	evidence.	
Finally,	the	most	important	but	difficult	question:	
what	pedagogy	is	to	be	employed	to	teach	NOS?	
The	idea	that	content	alone	is	not	enough	in	
science	education	is	not	new,	as	the	history	of	
curriculum	reforms	since	the	1960s	(or	even	
earlier)	shows.	Around	the	1970s,	some	
educational	reforms	emphasized	processes	of	
science	more	than	its	content:	observing,	
measuring,	classifying,	analysing,	inferring,	
interpreting,	experimenting,	predicting,	
communicating,	etc.	Soon	there	were	critical	
appraisals	of	this	approach;	some	educators	
questioned	the	very	premise	that	there	are	a	set	
of	general	transferable	processes	common	to	all	
sciences.	See,	for	example,	Millar	and	Driver	
(1987)⁷.	For	some	time	now,	there	seems	to	be	a	
broad	convergence	on	an	Inquiry-based	approach	
to	science	learning	and	teaching.	This	approach,	
informed	by	the	constructivist	philosophy,	no	
doubt,	involves	learning	the	processes	of	science	
mentioned	above;	but	it	goes	much	further,	to	
include	posing	questions,	critical	thinking,	giving	
evidence-based	explanation,	justifying	it,	and	
connecting	it	to	existing	scientific	knowledge,	etc.	
Basically,	this	approach	advocates	the	learning	of	
science	in	a	manner	that	resembles	the	way	
scientists	carry	out	their	investigations.
Inquiry	tasks	are	naturally	relatively	simple	for	
younger	children,	and	quite	elaborate	for	the	
more	mature	students,	but	they	
share	the	common	feature	of	
posing	a	question	and	seeking	
an	evidence-based	
explanation.	They	can	have	
different	foci;	some	may	
relate	to	STS	issues,	
while	others	may	be	
more	discipline-
oriented.	Inquiry	may	
also	include	reflections	
on	the	inquiry	mode	
itself,	and	thus	naturally	
incorporate	NOS	
educational	objectives.	We	
refer	the	reader	to	a	critical	
account	of	the	Inquiry	
approach,	including	its	relation	
with	NOS,	in	Flick	and	Lederman	
(2006)⁸.
	Another	approach	uses	the	History	of	Science	
(HOS)	as	a	means	to	teach	NOS.	This	again	is	not	a	
new	idea;	see	the	excellent	book	by	Holton	and	
Brush	(2001)⁹.	Some	key	points	in	its	favour	are	
thought	to	be:	HOS	involves	human	narratives	
which	enliven	science	and	engage	students’	
interest;	it	often	has	parallels	with	students’	
spontaneous	conceptions	and	thus	helps	us	in	
anticipating	and	remedying	their	content-specific	
ideas;	knowing	how	present	science	arose	from	
competing	ideas	at	different	times	in	history	can	
promote	critical	thinking;	and	lastly,	HOS	is	the	
most	natural	setting	for	learning	NOS.	We	refer	
the	reader	to	a	comprehensive	Handbook	brought	
out	recently	on	this	issue	(Matthews	2014)¹⁰.	
As	Lederman	(2006)¹¹	has	forcefully	argued,	NOS	
objectives	should	be	regarded	as	primarily	
cognitive	outcomes	that	can	be	properly	assessed.	
Instruction	needs	to	bring	them	out	explicitly,	
they	are	unlikely	to	be	assimilated	implicitly,	
whether	we	adopt	an	Inquiry	or	a	History	based	
approach.	A	whole	range	of	inquiry	tasks	and	HOS	
based	vignettes,	explicitly	focussed	on	NOS;	need	
to	be	developed	if	we	aim	to	improve	student	
understanding	of	nature	of	science.
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latus is the gas 
generated in, or 
expelled from, the 
digestive tract, especially the 
stomach and intestines. More 
than 99% of human flatus 
comprises nitrogen, oxygen, 
hydrogen (hydrogen-
consuming bacteria in the 
digestive tract may consume 
some of this to produce 
methane and other gases), 
carbon dioxide, and methane.
During World War II, US 
fighter pilots flew at increasing 
altitudes. The associated 
reduction in the (external) 
atmospheric pressure allowed 
the digestive gases trapped in 
their intestines to expand 
(Boyle’s law), causing very 
painful cramps. Foods known 
for their ability to produce 
flatus – dried beans and peas, 
vegetables of the cabbage 
family, carbonated drinks, and 
beer – were therefore 
removed from pilots’ menus.
Methane is a combustible gas 
(e.g. a good fuel for Bunsen 
burners), although it is 
produced by only about one-
third of people in the Western 
world. In the early days of the 
space race, there was some 
concern that the methane 
emitted by astronauts, if 
accidentally ignited, could 
cause an explosion within the 
spacecraft. No such incidents 
have occurred to date. 
However, exploding flatus has 
caused the accidental death 
of at least one surgical 
patient. An electrode touched 
to the patient’s colon ignited 
the hydrogen and methane it 
contained, also causing the 
surgeon to be blown back to 
the wall of the room.
Flatus: Beware!
